You`ve accepted that you`re worth it, so you laugh at it and say, “Oh, of course,” but you don`t believe it. And because you don`t believe it, it won`t affect you. Read more: www.oprah.com/own-super-soul-sunday/how-to-live-the-four-agreements-qa-with-don-miguel-ruiz/all#ixzz5mKREJtzj Nothing others do is because of you. It`s a brave statement, but think about it. If we stop making ourselves responsible for the actions of others, it will radically change our world. Every situation is personal for that person. We have already talked about the fact that we learned from an early age our agreements about life and the rules by which we must live. And these agreements that we tell ourselves influence all our thoughts and opinions.
The prisoners` dilemma is a scenario where the benefits of cooperation are greater than the rewards of pursuing their own interests. This is good for oligopolies. The story behind the prisoners` dilemma is this: Oligopolistic companies join a cartel to increase their market power, and members work together to determine the level of production each member will produce and/or the price each member will ask for. Thanks to this cooperation, the members of the cartel are able to act as a monopoly. For example, when each company sells an undifferentiated product such as oil in an oligopoly, the demand curve that each company faces is horizontal to the market price. However, if oil-producing companies form a cartel like OPEC to determine their production and price, they will face together a downward market demand curve, just like a monopoly. In fact, the winning decision of the cartel is the same as that of a monopoly, as Figure shows. Cartel members choose their combined production at the level where their combined marginal incomes correspond to their combined marginal costs. The cartel price is determined by the market demand curve at the level of production chosen by the cartel. The benefits of the cartel correspond to the area of the rectangular box with the inscription abcd on the figure. Note that a cartel like a monopoly will choose to produce less production and demand a higher price than the market in a perfectly competitive market. The result of this prisoners` dilemma is often that, although A and B could make the highest combined profits by working together to produce a lower level of production and behaving like a monopoly, both companies may well find themselves in a situation where they would increase production and earn only $400.
The Clear It Up feature below talks about a cartel scandal. Members of an oligopoly may also face a prisoner`s dilemma. If each of the oligopolites works together to keep production low, then high monopoly profits are possible. However, any oligopoly must be concerned that other firms, while keeping production low, take advantage of the high price by increasing production and making higher profits. Table 4 presents the prisoners` dilemma for an oligopoly with two companies – known as the duopoly. . . .
The borrower may try to limit this to his own obligations (and not those of other debtors), the borrower`s payment obligations and (sometimes) his financial obligations. The classification of credit agreements by type of facility generally leads to two main categories: availability: the borrower should check that institutions are available when the borrower needs them (e.g. B to finance an acquisition). Lenders often think they have to resign two or three days in advance before institutions can be used or removed. This can often be reduced to one day`s notice, or in some cases even notice up to a certain amount of time on the day of use. The lender must have enough time to process the loan application, and if there are multiple lenders, it usually takes at least 24 hours. Guarantees and guarantees should only be valid for as long as the creditor is entitled to funds or the creditor is required to lend, and any guarantee and guarantee that applies to the original information (e.g. B the business plan or the accounting officer`s report) should not be repeated for the duration of the facility. . .